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Beyond Reasonableness: The Dignitarian Structure of Human and Constitutional 
Rights 
 
Abstract: Human and constitutional rights theory in the last two decades focused initially on 
the principle of proportionality and subsequently on the ideas of the ‘culture of justification’ 
and the related ‘right to justification’. The view that emerged from these discussions is that 
proportionality is essentially a reasonableness test and that, correspondingly, a commitment 
to reasonable justification lies at the heart of human and constitutional rights. This essay 
criticises the focus on reasonableness which neglects the core substantive promise of rights, 
namely their commitment to human dignity. It argues that the three dignitarian principles of 
intrinsic value, moral autonomy, and fundamental equality form the substantive core of rights, 
and it demonstrates that this is consistent with and creates a stronger moral foundation for 
contemporary rights adjudication and the culture of justification.  
 
I. Introduction 
The last two decades have witnessed a wide-ranging and global discussion of the theory and 
structure of human and constitutional rights. This debate initially focused on the principle of 
proportionality and subsequently on the related ideas of the ‘culture of justification’ and the 
‘right to justification’. There is now a far-reaching agreement that both proportionality and 
justification in human and constitutional rights law are concerned with the reasonableness, 
alternatively the justification in terms of public reason, of the act under consideration. Thus, 
reasonableness and/or public reason have assumed a, perhaps the, central place in the theory 
of human and constitutional rights.  
This article challenges this picture as incomplete and unbalanced. The somewhat stale and 
uninspiring connotations of the concepts of reasonableness and public reason should make us 
pause and reflect on whether they adequately capture what is important about fundamental 
rights. Furthermore, an account of rights that places these concepts at its core underemphasises 
the grand values on which the human rights tradition is built, namely human dignity, freedom, 
and equality. I will argue that the moral core of human and constitutional rights consists of a 
commitment not to reasonableness or public reason but to human dignity and its three sub-
principles of intrinsic value, moral autonomy, and fundamental equality. Reasonableness has 
its place in the theory of rights, but it is more peripheral: human and constitutional rights insist 
that policies and acts be reasonably justifiable under the dignitarian structure which lies at their 
core.  
Section II presents an overview of the development of the theory of human and constitutional 
rights in the last two decades, which explains how reasonableness and public reason assumed 
the centrality that they have today. Section III demonstrates that these two concepts cannot do 
the moral work that is required of them. Section IV presents an outline of the dignitarian 
structure that lies at the core of human and constitutional rights and shows how this structure 
manifests itself in rights adjudication. Section V concludes by showing that shifting the focus 
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from reasonableness to the dignitarian structure of rights provides a deeper and more attractive 
account of the culture of justification and the right to justification.  
 
II. The theory of human and constitutional rights: from formal to substantive 
Human and constitutional rights theory has flourished since the early 2000s. If we had to point 
to one moment that kicked off this development, it would be the publication of the English 
translation of Robert Alexy’s magisterial A Theory of Constitutional Rights in 2002.1 The main 
achievement of that book was to provide an intriguing theory of the principle of proportionality, 
which is indisputably the most important doctrinal tool in rights adjudication. Alexy argued 
that constitutional rights are best conceptualised as principles or optimisation requirements, 
and that it follows as a matter of logic(!) that proportionality analysis has to be employed when 
a right gets into conflict with another right or principle.2 Alexy’s book sparked a wide-ranging 
debate about the role of the principle of proportionality in rights adjudication that continues 
until this day.3   
Despite the indisputable strengths of the theory, neither proportionality as such nor Alexy’s 
theory have gone without criticism.4 The main weakness of Alexy’s theory is that it is formal, 
or, as Alexy calls it, structural, as opposed to substantive moral. Thus, the language that Alexy 
	
1 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (transl. Julian Rivers, Oxford University 
Press, 2002).  
2 Ibid., ch. 3.  
3 See, for example, the following edited collections: Grant Huscroft, Bradley Miller, and 
Gregoire Webber, Proportionality and the Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014); 
Vicki Jackson and Mark Tushnet, Proportionality: New Frontiers, New Challenges 
(Cambridge University Press, 2017). Other central contributions include Aharon Barak, 
Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (Cambridge University Press, 
2012); David Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, 2004); Dieter 
Grimm, ‘Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence’, (2007) 
University of Toronto Law Journal 383; Mattias Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: 
On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional Rights’, (2004) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 574; Mattias Kumm, ‘Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights: On 
the Place and Limits of the Proportionality Requirement’, in Pavlakos (ed.), Law, Rights and 
Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy (Hart, 2007), 131; Kai Möller, 
‘Proportionality: Challenging the Critics’, (2012) International Journal of Constitutional Law 
709.  
4 See in particular Stavros Tsakyrakis, “Proportionality: An assault on human rights?,” (2009) 
7 International Journal of Constitutional Law 468; Grégoire Webber, The Negotiable 
Constitution: On the Limitation of Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2009); Francisco 
Urbina, ‘Is It Really That Easy? A Critique of Proportionality and “Balancing as Reasoning”’, 
27 (2014) Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 167.  
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uses is one of ‘rules’, ‘principles’, ‘optimisation’, ‘logic’, and so on. The problem with this 
approach is that, as I have argued elsewhere,5 fundamental rights are creatures of morality and 
therefore a useful account of their structure must be a moral one. Thus, while the more recent 
scholarship on the theory of human and constitutional rights builds on and is indebted to 
Alexy’s work (more on this below), by and large,6 the search for a formal theory has been 
abandoned and instead substantive moral accounts of rights are proposed.  
If Alexy’s book marks the ‘first wave’ of scholarship theorising proportionality-based judicial 
review, then a number of publications by various scholars writing about the ‘culture of 
justification’ and the related idea of the ‘right to justification’ can be referred to as the ‘second 
wave’.7 The term ‘culture of justification’, originally coined by the South African public law 
scholar Etienne Mureinik,8 refers to a constitutional culture (a better term might be 
‘constitutional structure’) that acknowledges every citizen’s right to challenge any policy or 
act by the state that places a burden on him or her before the courts and ultimately the 
constitutional court; the main doctrinal tool that courts will use to assess the justifiability of the 
policy or act in question is, again, proportionality.9  
Thus, the culture of justification – which has been called the ‘emerging global legal culture’ by 
Iddo Porat and Moshe Cohen-Eliya10 – rejects a number of conventional views about human 
and constitutional rights. First, it rejects the view that rights protect only a limited domain of 
narrowly defined interests (such as interests relating to speech, religion, life, freedom from 
torture, etc); on the contrary, the culture of justification claims that any burden, including trivial 
	
5 [removed for review] 
6 An exception is Matthias Klatt and Moritz Meister, The Constitutional Structure of 
Proportionality (Oxford University Press, 2012).  
7 Key publications here are David Dyzenhaus, ‘Proportionality and Deference in a Culture of 
Justification’, in Huscroft, Miller, and Webber, Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, 
Reasoning, Justification (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 234; Mattias Kumm, ‘The Idea 
of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The Point of Rights-Based 
Proportionality Review’, (2010) Law & Ethics of Human Rights 141; Kai Möller, The Global 
Model of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, 2012); Kai Möller, ‘Justifying the 
Culture of Justification’, (2019) International Journal of Constitutional Law 1078; Iddo Porat 
and Moshe Cohen-Eliya, Proportionality and Constitutional Culture (Cambridge University 
Press, 2013).  
8 Etienne Mureinik, ‘A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights’, 10 (1994) 
South African Journal on Human Rights 31, 32. See further David Dyzenhaus, ‘Law as 
Justification: Etienne Mureinik’s Conception of Legal Culture’, 14 (1998) South African 
Journal of Human Rights 11. 
9 Kai Möller, ‘Justifying the Culture of Justification’, (2019) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 1078, 1078-9. 
10 Cohen-Eliya and Porat (above n 7), 7.  
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ones, should be reviewable by, ultimately, the constitutional court.11 Doctrinally, this is 
achieved by either acknowledging a general right to liberty or freedom of action (as in the case 
of the German Federal Constitutional Court12) or by interpreting certain rights, in particular the 
right to private life, very broadly (as in the case of the European Court of Human Rights13). 
The effect of this is that a great number of state acts interfere with a protected right and thus 
trigger the duty of justification and proportionality analysis. Incidentally, this sits neatly with 
Alexy’s theory of rights which, too, endorses the German Federal Constitutional Court’s 
acknowledgment of a general right to liberty and thus rejects the conventional view about the 
limited scope of rights.14  
Second, the culture of justification does away with a widely held view according to which 
rights have a special normative force in the sense that their limitation can only exceptionally 
be justified. This view arguably underlies much of U.S. constitutional jurisprudence and in 
particular its ‘strict scrutiny’ test. As the saying goes, strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory but fatal 
in fact’,15 indicating that it is an uphill battle for the state to convince a court of the necessity 
of the limitation of a fundamental right. Furthermore, and glossing over some complications, 
such a view can be attributed to Ronald Dworkin’s famous theory of rights as trumps,16 which 
at least superficially contrasts with Alexy’s view of rights as optimisation requirements.17 
Instead, the culture of justification requires only that the state act in question be ‘justifiable’. 
The tool used to assess justifiability is proportionality, and proportionality in turn is seen by 
the culture of justification as a test of reasonableness and/or public reason.18  
The moral foundation of the culture of justification is seen in every person’s fundamental ‘right 
to justification’, that is, a right to be subjected to the coercive power of the state only if such 
	
11 Cohen-Eliya and Porat (above n 7), 119; Möller (above n 9), 1083.  
12 BVerfGE 6, 32 (Elfes); BVerfGE 54, 143 (Pigeon-Feeding); BVerfGE 80, 137 (Riding in 
the Woods). 
13 See George Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Oxford University Press, 2007), 126-130. 
14 Alexy (above n 1), ch. 7.  
15 Gerald Gunther, ‘The Supreme Court, 1971 Term – Foreword: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection’, (1972) 86 Harvard 
Law Review 1, 8. 
16 For an early statement, see Ronald Dworkin, ‘Rights as Trumps’, in Jeremy Waldron (ed.) 
Theories of Rights (Oxford University Press, 1984), 153. For his later work, see Is Democracy 
Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate (Princeton University Press, 2006), 31.  
17 For a view that challenges this picture see Jacob Weinrib, Dimensions of Dignity (Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), 245-251; Kai Möller, ‘Dworkin’s Theory of Rights in the Age of 
Proportionality’, (2018) Law & Ethics of Human Rights 281.  
18 Cohen-Eliya and Porat (above n 7), 112; Kumm (above n 7), 168-170; Möller (above n 9), 
1089-1092.  
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power is substantively justifiable. The most fully developed account of this is Mattias Kumm’s 
theory of rights adjudication as Socratic contestation.19 Kumm argues that the right to 
justification is as fundamental as the right to vote. The key to understanding the interplay 
between the two lies in the idea of reasonable disagreement. Democratic (in the sense of 
majoritarian) voting is about choosing between different reasonably justifiable policies; the 
role of judicial review is to police the boundaries of this process, that is, to ensure that the 
chosen policy is indeed reasonably justifiable to those on whom it imposes a burden and 
respects their right to justification. Thus, a court engaging in judicial review does not ask the 
question of whether the policy at stake is ‘right’, ‘correct’ or ‘the best possible policy’; rather 
it asks whether it is reasonably justifiable, or, synonymously for Kumm, justifiable in terms of 
public reason; only if it is not does the court reach the conclusion that it violates rights. The 
tool that courts use to carry out this assessment is proportionality, which accordingly is 
conceptualised as a test of public reason.  
Thus, if we look at the development between the first and the second ‘waves’ of human and 
constitutional rights scholarship, we see that several of Alexy’s insights are carried over – in 
particular the centrality, practical usefulness, and structure of the principle of proportionality, 
the commitment to the wide scope of rights, and the rejection of the view that rights have a 
special normative force. However, the ‘second wave’ scholars abandon Alexy’s commitment 
to the formal nature of his theory. Rights theory goes substantive and a view about the moral 
point of rights is articulated, namely to protect every person’s right to justification; the scope 
of rights and the appropriate standard of review (proportionality as a reasonableness review) 
are derived from this moral starting point. In the next section I will argue that while this is an 
improvement over Alexy’s theory, it is incomplete. As I will show, the concepts of 
‘reasonableness’, ‘reasonable disagreement’ and ‘public reason’ cannot do what is required of 
them if our goal is to give a fully-fledged moral account of human and constitutional rights.  
 
III. Reasonableness, reasonable disagreement, and public reason 
This section demonstrates that a theory of rights that presents as its core a commitment to 
reasonableness and/or justifiability in terms of public reason is incomplete. The first subsection 
examines the concept of reasonableness. The second subsection proposes what I call ‘the 
procedural conception of reasonableness’ and shows that this conception is broader than the 
standard of review properly used in human and constitutional rights law. The third subsection 
shows that this gap cannot be closed by invoking the concept of public reason. The fourth 
subsection concludes that the commitment to reasonableness or public reason must be 
complemented with a further commitment to a number of substantive values and suggests that 
these values can be found in the dignitarian structure of human and constitutional rights.  
 
1. The concept of reasonableness 
	
19 Kumm (above n 7).  
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Reasonableness is a concept widely used in different areas of law as well as in philosophy, but 
it is not easy to define. According to Alexy, the idea of reasonableness ‘requires, first, that all 
factors that might be relevant in answering a practical question be considered and, second, that 
they be assembled in a correct relation to each other in order to justify the judgment that 
provides the answer.’20 The famous English Wednesbury case lays out a similar structure:  
‘… I will summarize once again the principle applicable. The court is entitled to investigate the action of the local 
authority with a view to seeing whether they have taken into account matters which they ought not to take into 
account, or, conversely, have refused to take into account or neglected to take into account matters which they 
ought to take into account. Once that question is answered in favour of the local authority, it may be still possible 
to say that, although the local authority have kept within the four corners of the matters which they ought to 
consider, they have nevertheless come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever 
have come to it. In such a case, again, I think the court can interfere.’21 
Collecting the relevant (and excluding the irrelevant) considerations and then identifying the 
correct relation of these considerations strikes me as the right approach in principle. The 
practical problem, of course, lies in the fact that often, it will be far from obvious what the 
relevant considerations are and what their correct relation really is. The judges in the 
Wednesbury case fell into the trap of circularity when they defined reasonableness with regard 
to the view that a ‘reasonable authority’ could take: this, of course, just shifts the problem from 
the decision to the person or body making the decision. In the next subsection I will present a 
procedural account of reasonableness that avoids this problem.  
Leaving aside the conceptual complications, a couple of things can be said about 
reasonableness in public law, including rights adjudication. The first is that insisting that a 
decision be reasonable (or reasonably justifiable) excludes non-reason-based justifications. 
Thus, mere reference to tradition (‘We have always done things this way!’), pedigree (‘It’s 
justified because the public authority / the legislature / the framers said so!’), feelings (‘In this 
town, we just love/hate opera!’), etc., is insufficient; rather, a justification can only succeed if 
based on reason. (Needless to say, it may sometimes be the case that tradition, pedigree, or 
feelings play a role in the determination of the reasonableness of a decision; for example, the 
fact that a certain tradition exists may be relevant in determining whether there are good reasons 
for its continuation, or the fact that a large number of people like or dislike a certain option 
may be relevant in deciding about its adoption.) 
Second, in public law, reference to reasonableness is coupled with an acknowledgement of the 
relevance of reasonable disagreement, that is, the fact that reasonable people will often disagree 
about the right course of action. Thus, reasonableness review indicates that the courts will not 
inquire whether the public authority in question reached the ‘right’, ‘best possible’ or ‘correct’ 
decision; rather they will only inquire whether the decision is one of (usually) a range of 
decisions that can be considered reasonable. The Wednesbury court stressed this point: 
	
20 Robert Alexy, The Reasonableness of Law’, in Bongiovanni, Sartor, and Valentini (eds), 
Reasonableness and Law (Springer, 2009), 5, 7.  
21 Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation, [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA), 
233-4. 
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‘I think Mr. Gallop in the end agreed that his proposition that the decision of the local authority can be upset if it 
is proved to be unreasonable, really meant that it must be proved to be unreasonable in the sense that the court 
considers it to be a decision that no reasonable body could have come to. It is not what the court considers 
unreasonable, a different thing altogether. If it is what the court considers unreasonable, the court may very well 
have different views to that of a local authority on matters of high public policy of this kind. Some courts might 
think that no children ought to be admitted on Sundays at all, some courts might think the reverse, and all over 
the country I have no doubt on a thing of that sort honest and sincere people hold different views. The effect of 
the legislation is not to set up the court as an arbiter of the correctness of one view over another.’22  
The same is true today in rights adjudication, where courts applying the proportionality test 
regularly stress that their role is not to second-guess the original decision but merely to assess 
its proportionality or reasonableness, which is a wider standard than correctness.23 Thus, it 
strikes me as correct to say that there is no principled difference between Wednesbury 
reasonableness and proportionality in that both tests are concerned with the reasonableness of 
the act under consideration, and that the main practical difference is that proportionality tends 
to be applied with less deference than Wednesbury reasonableness.24  
The above points regarding the focus on reason and the acknowledgment of the relevance of 
reasonable disagreement are important guidelines in the context of human and constitutional 
rights adjudication. However, both are negative in character in that they do not point to a 
substantive content of reasonableness but merely exclude non-reason-based standards and a 
correctness standard of review, without specifying positively what the standard to be applied 
actually is.  
 
2. The procedural conception of reasonableness 
To avoid the problem of defining the reasonableness of a decision by referring to the reasonable 
decision-maker, I wish to propose the following, procedural, conception of reasonableness: we 
should regard as reasonable a view that an educated and intelligent person, acting in good faith 
and after due reflection, could consider to be true.25 The requirements of ‘educated and 
	
22 Ibid., 230-1.  
23 Aileen Kavanagh, Constitutional Review Under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 240.  
24 See Kavanagh (above n 23), 243-253; Möller (above n 9), 1091, fn. 38; Thomas Poole and 
Sangeeta Shah, ‘A Very Successful Action? Historical Wrongs at Common Law’, LSE Law, 
Society and Economy Working Papers 17/2016 (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2869840), 17-20. For the judicial 
discussion of this issue and broadly similar conclusions, see R (Daly) v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, [2001] UKHL 26, para. 27 (Lord Steyn); Pham v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, [2015] UKSC 19, paras 103-109 (Lord Sumption).  
25 Note that the Wednesbury court comes close to this when in the quote above it refers to the 
fact that ‘honest and sincere people hold different views.’ ‘Honest and sincere’ avoids the 
circularity problem.   
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intelligent’ replace reference to the ‘reasonable’ person, in order to avoid the circularity 
problem mentioned above. I call this conception ‘procedural’ because it has no substantive 
requirements with regard to the view in question but only procedural ones: any view, no matter 
what its content, is regarded as reasonable if it survives a process of careful and good faith 
reflection by an educated and intelligent person. I should also add that my definition could well 
be regarded as too demanding: surely people who are not particularly intelligent or well-
educated will also regularly arrive at reasonable conclusions. The point of setting the bar 
relatively high is not elitism but preparing the ground for demonstrating that even this, 
demanding, account of reasonableness is too wide in the context of rights adjudication.  
I will proceed to show that the procedural conception of reasonableness would characterise a 
whole range of views as reasonable that relatively uncontroversially are incompatible with the 
requirements of human and constitutional rights. Before I give examples, a note of caution is 
in order: there is the risk that we smuggle a set of substantive convictions about the scope of 
reasonableness into the procedural conception by claiming that surely, an ‘adequately’ 
intelligent person, after ‘due’ reflection and acting in ‘genuinely’ good faith could never hold 
this or that view. The procedural account of reasonableness properly understood blocks this 
route, precisely because of its procedural nature. It does not allow us to question the outcome 
reached on substantive grounds.  
Here are three examples of views that are reasonable (under the procedural account) and yet 
relatively uncontroversially (and to my mind, correctly) considered to violate rights. Each 
example is an application of one of the dignitarian principles that I will introduce in the next 
section.  
First, take the example of the permissibility of torture as a measure to prevent terrorist attacks. 
The large majority of human and constitutional rights lawyers consider torture to be legally 
and morally unjustifiable in all circumstances.26 However, Alan Dershowitz (and others) have 
argued that in extreme circumstances torture can be justified if the benefits outweigh the 
costs.27 Given that Dershowitz is an established academic, obviously well-educated and 
intelligent, who has thought about this issue with considerable care, and given that we have no 
reason to question his good faith, it follows that we must regard his views as reasonable under 
the procedural conception of reasonableness. If we are also attached to the view that torture 
violates rights, then we have established a gap between the procedural conception of 
reasonableness and the requirements of rights. As I will show below, the reason for this gap is 
that human and constitutional rights are committed to upholding the dignitarian idea of the 
	
26 See, for example, the European Court of Human Rights’ view in the Gäfgen case: ‘The Court 
has confirmed that even in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism 
and organised crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the conduct of the person concerned.’ 
(Gäfgen v. Germany, (2011) 52 E.H.R.R. 1, para. 87).  
27 Alan Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works (Yale University Press, 2003), 132-163.  
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intrinsic value of each individual, which is inconsistent with torture, whereas procedural 
reasonableness has no such inbuilt substantive requirement.  
Second, let us consider the example of assisted suicide. I do not have in mind the issue of 
whether, all things considered, terminally ill people who are no longer capable of killing 
themselves without assistance have a right to assisted suicide. Rather, my interest here is in one 
particular facet of this debate, namely the question of whether assisted suicide can be prohibited 
by pointing to the fact that the state has a legitimate interest in preserving human life. This is a 
widely used argument in the debate about assisted suicide; for example, the (now) US Supreme 
Court Justice Neil Gorsuch proposed a version of this argument in his book The Future of 
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, where he argued that human life is inherently valuable and 
that its intentional taking by private persons is always wrong.28 Gorsuch is intelligent and 
educated (he has a doctorate from Oxford which formed the basis of his book), and there is 
nothing to indicate that he has not thought about this issue for a long time and in good faith. 
Hence, his view passes as reasonable under the procedural conception of reasonableness. 
However, courts have, by and large29 and to my mind correctly, rejected the argument from the 
intrinsic value of human life and pointed out that it would be inappropriate to disregard the 
perspective of the person whose life it is;30 the permissibility of assisted suicide then turns on 
	
28 Neil Gorsuch, The Future of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia (Princeton University Press, 
2006), ch. 9.  
29 An exception is the US Supreme Court, which has accepted by a 5:4 majority the argument 
that the state has an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life; see Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), 282: ‘Finally, we think a State 
may properly decline to make judgments about the “quality” of life that a particular individual 
may enjoy, and simply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life to be 
weighed against the constitutionally protected interests of the individual.’ See, however, the 
dissent by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun JJ, ibid., 314: ‘Thus, the State's general interest 
in life must accede to Nancy Cruzan's particularized and intense interest in self-determination 
in her choice of medical treatment. There is simply nothing legitimately within the State's 
purview to be gained by superseding her decision.’ See further Stevens J, also in dissent, ibid., 
345: ‘The State's unflagging determination to perpetuate Nancy Cruzan's physical existence is 
comprehensible only as an effort to define life's meaning, not as an attempt to preserve its 
sanctity.’  
30 This has recently been pointed out most strikingly and clearly by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court in a judgment which declared the criminalisation of assisted suicide 
services unconstitutional: ‘The general right of personality … encompasses a right to a self-
determined death. This right includes the freedom to take one’s own life … Where, in the 
exercise of this right, an individual decides to end their own life, having reached this decision 
based on how they personally define quality of life and a meaningful existence, their decision 
must, in principle, be respected by state and society as an act of autonomous self-
determination.’ (Press Release No. 12/2020 of 26 February 2020, available at 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2020/bvg20-
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other factors, such as the likelihood of abuse. Thus, there is yet another gap between procedural 
reasonableness and the requirements of rights which, as the next section will show, is best 
explained by the dignitarian principle of moral autonomy.  
My third example is same-sex marriage. I assume that the view increasingly taken by liberal 
democracies, namely that rights require the availability of same sex marriage,31 is correct. Just 
as in the case of torture, however, the issue of same sex marriage is very controversial. The 
philosopher John Finnis is well known for his opposition to same sex marriage, which is 
grounded in his famous theory of natural law and natural rights; he argues that ‘[s]ince the 
sexual acts of same-sex partners (couples, threesomes, foursomes…) have no tendency at all 
to generate children, there is no reason why whatever commitment such partners wish to make 
to one another (as couples, threesomes, foursomes … for life or for five years…) should be 
thought of as marriage.’32 Now, fortunately for my argument, Finnis is a famous philosopher; 
we have no reason, therefore, to question his intelligence or willingness to engage in serious 
reflection. We might consider questioning his good faith on this issue (and find some evidence 
for this in the derisive tone of the above statement: ‘couples, threesomes, foursomes’; ‘for life 
or for five years’); but if all scholarship which displayed an element of neurotic involvement 
on the part of the author was considered to be produced in bad faith, there would perhaps not 
be much left to take seriously. Note also that we cannot derive the existence of bad faith from 
	
012.html;jsessionid=68998647AF09E565F22C29C47D9628E7.1_cid370; judgment (in 
German) available at 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2020/02/rs20200
226_2bvr234715.html). See further Pretty v. U.K., (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 1, para 65: ‘The very 
essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity and human freedom. Without in any 
way negating the principle of sanctity of life protected under the Convention, the Court 
considers that it is under Article 8 that notions of the quality of life take on significance. In an 
era of growing medical sophistication combined with longer life expectancies, many people 
are concerned that they should not be forced to linger on in old age or in states of advanced 
physical or mental decrepitude which conflict with strongly held ideas of self and personal 
identity.’ Carter v. Canada, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331, para 63: ‘This said, we do not agree that  … 
individuals cannot “waive” their right to life.  This would create a “duty to live”, rather than a 
“right to life”’.  
31 Same sex marriage was in many cases legalised through the normal legislative processes. 
For judicial decisions to this effect, see in particular Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 
(United States); Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, (2005) ZACC 19 (South Africa); Judicial 
Yuan Interpretation No. 748 (2017) (Taiwan). The European Court of Human Rights’ position 
is that there is not yet sufficient consensus within the member states to allow a re-interpretation 
of Article 12 ECHR: Schalk v. Austria, (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 20, para. 58; however, in Oliari v. 
Italy, (2017) 65 E.H.R.R. 26, the Court found a positive obligation on the Italian authorities to 
create a legal framework providing for the recognition and protection of same sex unions.  
32 John Finnis, Human Rights and the Common Good: Collected Essays: Volume III (Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 326. 
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the fact that we disagree with a person’s substantive view. Therefore, I believe that under the 
procedural view of reasonableness, Finnis’ rejection of same sex marriage easily passes the 
threshold and must be considered reasonable. Thus, if we maintain that the availability of same 
sex marriage is a matter of rights, then there is a gap between procedural reasonableness and 
the requirements of rights. I will argue below that the reason for this gap lies in the dignitarian 
principle of fundamental equality. 
 
3. Public reason 
Mattias Kumm has proposed that human and constitutional rights require the justification of 
any act that places a burden on a person in terms of public reason. He argues that proportionality 
analysis is  
‘largely an exercise of structured practical reasoning without many of the constraining features that otherwise 
characterise legal reasoning … The proportionality test merely provides a structure for the demonstrable 
justification of an act in terms of reasons that are appropriate in a liberal democracy. Or to put it another way: It 
provides a structure for the justification of an act in terms of public reason.’33 
Thus, the invocation of the idea of public reason highlights two features of reasoning with 
rights. First, it stresses that rights adjudication is not concerned with conventional ways of legal 
reasoning (those that focus on the interpretation of a legal source) but rather with ‘free-
standing’ practical reasoning (Kumm calls this ‘the turn from interpretation to justification’34). 
Second, the practical reasoning is constrained in that only reasons that are ‘appropriate in a 
liberal democracy’ (and therefore ‘public’) are legitimate. This implies that some reasons are 
not appropriate in a liberal democracy (and correspondingly not ‘public’), namely, in particular, 
perfectionist reasons relating to the good life. (Here Kumm’s thinking is influenced by John 
Rawls’ account of public reason, even though Kumm makes it clear that he does not subscribe 
to Rawls’ theory in its entirety.35) The paradigmatic case of such, impermissible, reasons is 
religious reasons: in another paper, Kumm gives the example of a public authority justifying 
the introduction of compulsory school prayers by referring to the necessity of creating ‘souls 
worthy of salvation’.36  
As a preliminary point, both the usefulness of the idea of public reason and its proper 
interpretation are a matter of fierce philosophical debate, which is of limited relevance in the 
context of rights adjudication and therefore not my interest in this paper. However, there is also 
a separate discussion about the usefulness of the idea of public reason specifically in rights 
adjudication. Jeremy Waldron, a sceptic in this regard, has argued that the idea of public reason 
should be seen as requiring that reasons must be offered ‘as something for others to grasp, 
	
33 Kumm (above n 7), 150, emphases omitted.  
34 Kumm, (above n 7), 142.  
35 Kumm, (above n 7), 150, fn 16.  
36 Kumm, ‘Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights: On the Place and Limits of the 
Proportionality Requirement’ (above n 3), 143.  
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consider, and engage with’37 (and he then claims that even religious reasons can be offered in 
this spirit; holding otherwise ‘underestimates people’s ability to grapple with unfamiliar views 
that start out with no foothold in their own mentality or motivational set’38). Wojciech Sadurski 
has criticised Waldron’s approach and insisted that an idea should not only be ‘graspable’ but 
also ‘endorseable’ by others, which narrows the range of acceptable reasons and excludes 
religious ones.39 I will work with Sadurski’s narrower interpretation when assessing Kumm’s 
claims.  
I have two concerns about Kumm’s invocation of the idea of public reason. First, I believe that 
the actual concern at the heart of Kumm’s argument is not for the publicness of the reasons 
given but for the dignitarian principle of moral autonomy (on which more in the next section). 
I agree with Kumm’s claim, which is widely endorsed in liberal philosophy,40 that rights 
require that states abstain from imposing perfectionist ideals on their citizens. But I don’t think 
that the reason for this is that perfectionist policies violate a requirement of publicness: almost 
all views, including those that violate liberal neutrality, can be put forward in a language that 
does not rest on controversial ethical viewpoints and is therefore ‘endorseable’ (in Sadurski’s 
terminology). To illustrate the point, let us take Kumm’s example of compulsory school 
prayers. I will grant that the reason of ‘creating souls worthy of salvation’ is not ‘public’. But 
if the authority made the same point in a secular language, its ‘public’ nature would be difficult 
to deny. Assume the authority argues that ‘compulsory school prayers create a sense of 
community and are thus desirable from a developmental perspective; they contribute to making 
the students more well-balanced’. There are all kinds of critical questions we could ask about 
this reasoning (‘Is it empirically true?’; ‘Is there evidence?’; ‘Are there alternatives?’), but it 
would be a stretch to deny its ‘publicness’: the reasoning employed by the authority could in 
principle be endorsed by members of many different ethical (including religious) convictions. 
The real problem with compulsory school prayers is that they violate the students’ autonomy 
in religious matters (or the rights of their parents to educate them in line with their own religious 
convictions). Thus, the concern is for the dignitarian principle of moral autonomy, not the 
publicness of the reasons given.  
Second, while a commitment to the idea of justifiability in terms of public reason, as opposed 
to procedural reasonableness, may narrow the gap between procedural reasonableness and the 
demands of human and constitutional rights, it does not close it. At best (and ignoring my 
criticism in the previous paragraph), the commitment to public reason excludes perfectionist 
	
37 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Public Reason and Justification in the Courtroom’, 1 (2007) Journal of 
Law, Philosophy and Culture 107, 112.  
38 Ibid. 
39 Wojciech Sadurski, ‘Defending Public Reason’, Sydney Law School Research Paper 14/31, 
2 (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2410718).  
40 For a comprehensive discussion of this issue, see Jonathan Quong, Liberalism Without 
Perfection (Oxford University Press, 2011). For the context of rights adjudication, see George 
Letsas (above n 13), ch. 6.  
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reasons, such as religious reasons. But this is not enough. Take the above example of allowing 
torture in extreme cases.41 Proponents of this idea point to the gains in security that in their 
view can be achieved by using torture and argue that these gains should be balanced against 
the interests of terrorist suspects. This argument is entirely ‘public’ and yet, the near-consensus 
among courts and rights scholars is, to my mind correctly, that torture is impermissible in all 
cases. Thus, there is more to the moral structure of human and constitutional rights than a 
commitment to public reason.  
To this conclusion it could be objected that public reason should not be seen as primarily 
concerned, negatively, with the exclusion of certain reasons (for example, reasons that are not 
‘graspable or ‘endorseable’ by everyone) but that the concept should rather be seen to refer, 
positively, to reasons which are appropriate among free and equal citizens. For example, 
compulsory school prayers should be regarded as unjustifiable in terms of public reason 
because they are inconsistent with the students’ freedom; a discriminatory policy should be 
seen as unjustifiable in terms of public reason because it is inconsistent with each citizen’s 
equality. I have no substantive objection to this conceptualisation of public reason but doubt 
its necessity in the context of rights adjudication: we could invoke the values of freedom and 
equality directly and without the intermediate concept of public reason. So rather than 
suggesting, as Kumm does, that policies need to be ‘justifiable in terms of public reason’, it 
would be more to the point to say that they need to be ‘justifiable in terms of freedom and 
equality’. This is broadly the route that I will pursue in section IV, where I will argue that 
policies must be justifiable in light of the dignitarian principles of intrinsic value, moral 
autonomy, and fundamental equality.  
 
4. A Thicker Conception of Reasonableness?  
As I have demonstrated in subsection 2, a procedural understanding of reasonableness is too 
wide in the context of rights adjudication: rights prohibit some policies which are reasonable 
in the procedural sense. The idea of public reason as employed by Kumm at best narrows the 
gap somewhat but it does not close it. If procedural reasonableness and public reason cannot 
do the necessary moral work, perhaps a thicker, substantive, conception of reasonableness 
could? For example, John Rawls relied heavily on the idea of reasonable people, especially in 
his book Political Liberalism. He specified a number of features and characteristics of such 
people, which include them having a sense of justice, being ready to propose fair terms of 
cooperation, recognising the burdens of judgment and affirming only reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines.42 Maybe Rawls’ or another, thicker, conception of reasonableness 
could succeed in making sense of the moral structure of constitutional rights.  
My goal in this essay is to demonstrate that human and constitutional rights have a substantive 
moral core and to articulate its content. I do not dispute that it may be possible to read this core 
	
41 Section III.2.   
42 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 2nd edition, 2005), 81-86.  
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into a substantive conception of reasonableness and/or public reason. Note, though, that this 
has not yet been attempted in human and constitutional rights scholarship: none of the literature 
on the culture of justification, the right to justification, or proportionality which proposes to 
regard rights and/or proportionality as concerned with reasonableness or justifiability in terms 
of public reason has put forward a substantive conception of reasonableness. Therefore, any 
evaluation of the success of this route will have to wait. As I have pointed out above, I believe 
that there is a certain staleness about the language of reasonableness and public reason which 
fails to capture what is important about human and constitutional rights, and furthermore I think 
that the human rights tradition lends support to seeing dignity, freedom, and equality, as 
opposed to reasonableness, as the moral core of rights. Therefore, I will not pursue my project 
of articulating the substantive core of rights by refining the concept of reasonableness but rather 
by turning to the idea of human dignity.  
 
IV. The dignitarian structure of human and constitutional rights 
The previous section has shown that while the theory of human and constitutional rights needs 
the idea of reasonableness, rights also include certain substantive commitments that cannot be 
explained in the language of (procedural) reasonableness alone. This section proposes an 
account of these substantive commitments by introducing what I call the dignitarian structure 
of human and constitutional rights.  
The concept of human dignity captures and expresses the idea of the supreme value of the 
individual human being; but beyond this starting point, much is unclear and contested. My goal 
in this essay is not to present a new theory of dignity, nor is it to engage in a comprehensive 
analysis of the existing literature on human dignity. Rather, my more modest ambition is to 
identify three reasonably uncontroversial yet central facets of human dignity and to show how 
these manifest themselves in the practice and structure of human and constitutional rights law. 
The three facets that I will focus on are, first, the intrinsic value of every individual, second, 
the individual’s moral autonomy, and third, his or her fundamental equality. My claim is that 
these three principles form the moral ‘deep structure’ of human and constitutional rights.  
There are similarities with Ronald Dworkin’s account of dignity here. Dworkin’s influence is 
perhaps not surprising, given that he spent much of his life theorising rights and came to regard 
human dignity as their foundation.43 In his late work, especially in his books Is Democracy 
Possible Here? and Justice for Hedgehogs, he argued that human dignity consists of two 
	
43 In his earlier work, Dworkin regarded a right to equal concern and respect as foundational. 
See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, 1977), 272-3. In his later work, he 
introduced the idea of dignity as the foundation of rights. The idea of equal concern reappeared 
as the principle of intrinsic value (the first principle of human dignity) and the idea of equal 
respect became the principle of personal responsibility (the second principle of human dignity). 
See Ronald Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate 
(Princeton University Press, 2006), 32.  The centrality of human dignity is explained in Justice 
for Hedgehogs (Harvard University Press, 2011), in particular in ch. 9.  
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principles, which he called the principle of intrinsic value and the principle of personal 
responsibility (more on these below). For present purposes, I chose to divide his principle of 
intrinsic value (which, for Dworkin, includes a commitment to the equal value of every human 
life) into two, which I call the principle of intrinsic value and the principle of fundamental 
equality. As will become clear, this makes analytical and moral sense, and the two principles 
illuminate different facets of contemporary human and constitutional rights law. I should also 
state at the outset that I disagree with a number of Dworkin’s views on rights and dignity, and 
this section should not be read as an exercise in Dworkin scholarship. Interested readers are 
directed to an earlier paper in which I offer a re-interpretation of Dworkin’s theory of rights.44  
 
1. Intrinsic value 
While it is extremely difficult to come up with a definition or conception of human dignity, 
there is some, limited, consensus about its meaning. In his path-breaking study ‘Human Dignity 
and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’, Christopher McCrudden has claimed that there 
is a ‘minimum core’ to human dignity, which includes the claims that, first, every human being 
possesses an intrinsic worth, second, this worth should be recognised and respected by others, 
and third, recognising and respecting this worth requires that the state should be seen to exist 
for the sake of the individual human being rather than vice versa.45 The idea of intrinsic worth 
also appears in a modified form in Dworkin’s account of human dignity: 
‘The first principle [of human dignity] – which I shall call the principle of intrinsic value – holds that each human 
life has a special kind of objective value. It has value as potentiality; once a human life has begun, it matters how 
it goes.’46 
The claim that human lives have intrinsic value is very abstract, and its moral and legal 
implications are not obvious. While it would be imprudent to try to resolve this puzzle in the 
limited space available here, I would like to point out the direction that a more fully formed 
conception of the idea of intrinsic value would have to take by briefly engaging with Jeremy 
Waldron’s and Susanne Baer’s accounts of human dignity and clarifying how their ideas 
illuminate features of contemporary rights discourse.  
Waldron proposes to make the idea of human dignity operable by regarding it not as a value 
(to be balanced against other values) but as a high status or rank: 
‘A good account of human dignity will explain it as a very general status. But it will also generate an account of 
it as noble bearing and an account of the importance of the ban on humiliating and degrading treatment. That is 
	
44 [removed for review]. 
45 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’, 
(2008) European Journal of International Law 655, 679; on the centrality of the idea of 
intrinsic value see also Michael Rosen, ‘Dignity Past and Present’, in Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, 
Rank, and Rights (ed. Meir Dan-Cohen, Oxford University Press, 2012), 79, 86. 
46  Ronald Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate 
(Princeton University Press, 2006), 9.  
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what I am trying to do with an account of dignity as a high-ranking status, comparable to a rank of nobility – only 
a rank assigned now to every human person, equally without discrimination: dignity as nobility for the common 
man.’47 
Thus, under this approach we honour the intrinsic value of each person by treating him like a 
nobleman, as opposed to, for example, a slave; and it goes without saying that a nobleman will 
be treated as a person of the highest importance.  
Baer interprets the intrinsic value idea differently, namely as being about ‘the promise of 
recognition of diverse senses of self, as deserving of equal respect.’48 Here, the intrinsic worth 
of each person requires first and foremost that others look carefully at the person and all aspects 
of her personality and recognise her for who she really is, as opposed to who they would like 
her to be. Intrinsic worth is thus linked to individuality; and the recognition of the individuality 
of a person provides an almost automatic incentive for treating her respectfully, just as we 
would treat something that we recognise to be a unique piece of art more carefully and 
respectfully than something we consider to be a bag of waste.  
Thus, while Waldron’s and Baer’s theories of dignity are superficially very different, they both 
flesh out the idea of the high and intrinsic value of each person: Waldron through the idea of a 
high rank comparable to that of a nobleman; Baer through an acknowledgement of the 
individuality of each person. To repeat, this is not the place to resolve one of the deepest puzzles 
of legal, political, moral, and theological inquiry. But even with this sketchy account of 
intrinsic value, we can shed some light on the practice of contemporary human and 
constitutional rights law.  
Perhaps the most obvious application is the prohibition of slavery:49 assigning to someone the 
very low status of a slave is incompatible with the high rank (comparable to that of a nobleman) 
that for Waldron lies at the core of dignity.  
A similar idea applies to the prohibition of degrading treatment or punishment:50 degradation 
implies a loss in status, and it is precisely the high social rank or status of every person that 
prohibits such acts. This explains why the prohibition of degrading treatment captures even 
	
47 Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights (ed. Meir Dan-Cohen, Oxford University Press, 
2012), 22. 
48 Susanne Baer, ‘Dignity, Liberty, Equality: A Fundamental Rights Triangle of 
Constitutionalism’, (2009) University of Toronto Law Journal 417, 460.   
49 For example, Article 4 ECHR.  
50 An aspect of Article 3 ECHR. In its more recent case law, the European Court of Human 
Rights has stressed that ‘the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment is a value of civilisation closely bound up with respect for human dignity’; see 
Bouyid v Belgium (Grand Chamber), (2016) 62 E.H.R.R. 32, para. 81. In the same judgment, 
the Court also held that ‘there is a particularly strong link between the concepts of “degrading” 
treatment or punishment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention and respect for 
“dignity”’ (para. 90). 
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acts which in isolation do not necessarily have devastating consequences for the affected 
individual (in contrast to, for example, acts of torture and many instances of inhuman 
treatment), such as a slap in the face by a police officer:51 the specific evil is not about the 
consequences for the affected individual but about the denial of his high social rank: while 
noblemen, too, have to obey the law and can be punished if they fail to do so,52 their high social 
rank requires respectful treatment.  
The prohibition of inhuman treatment or punishment and the prohibition of torture,53 invite, I 
believe, an analysis along Baer’s conception of dignity. Inhuman treatment can be defined as 
treatment that no human being can reasonably be expected to endure.54 Thus, identifying what 
treatment is inhuman requires some attunement to the needs, the vulnerability, and the suffering 
of the other person (and therefore also some attunement to one’s own needs, vulnerability, and 
potential or actual suffering). Thus, it requires seeing the other person not in the way that one 
would perhaps prefer to see him: as a despicable criminal, or as someone who is just a nuisance. 
Rather, it requires seeing him, and therefore acknowledging him, as a person with a specific 
vulnerability, and one that is shared by all humans. Once this vulnerability is acknowledged, 
the impermissibility of treating him in inhuman ways becomes obvious.  
The right to a fair trial55 in general and the right to a hearing in particular, too, can be 
illuminated by Waldron’s and Baer’s conceptions of dignity. Under Waldron’s conception, it 
is clear that someone of the high social rank as a nobleman must be treated fairly and 
respectfully by the judicial system: it may be permissible to gloss over the legitimate interests 
of lowly persons, but certainly not of noblemen. This requires that they are given the 
opportunity to explain themselves.56 Along the lines of Baer’s conception, it is crucial to 
acknowledge the person for who she really is and not for who we think she might be or who 
we would like her to be. This, however, plainly requires giving her the opportunity to present 
her case and her point of view; thus, a right to a hearing is required.  
It seems unlikely that the above examples exhaust the reach of the principle of intrinsic value 
into human and constitutional rights law. We will see in the next sections that the dignitarian 
	
51 Bouyid v Belgium (above n 50).  
52 Waldron (above n 47), 64: ‘[E]veryone who is punished is to be punished now as though he 
were an errant noble rather than an errant slave.’  
53 Another aspect of Article 3 ECHR. See above n 50.   
54 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment: The Words Themselves’, 
(2010) Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 269, 280.  
55 For example, Article 6 ECHR.  
56 Waldron (above n 47), 54: ‘Law, we can say, is a mode of governance that acknowledges 
that people likely have a view or perspective of their own to present on the application of a 
social norm to their conduct. Applying a norm to a human individual … involves paying 
attention to a point of view. In this way it embodies a crucial dignitarian idea – respecting the 
dignity of those to whom the norms are applied as beings capable of explaining themselves.’ 
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principles of moral autonomy and fundamental equality are much better understood than the 
idea of intrinsic value. This imbalance indicates that in order to make further progress with 
uncovering the ‘deep structure’ of human and constitutional rights, the dignitarian idea of 
intrinsic value is the place to go.  
 
2. Moral autonomy 
Despite the difficulties of coming up with an account of dignity, let alone a reasonably 
uncontroversial one, there is far-reaching agreement that human dignity requires 
acknowledging and respecting human freedom, liberty, or autonomy (for present purposes I 
will treat these concepts as synonymous).57 These concepts are very abstract and open to 
different interpretations, for example the freedom to do as one pleases,58 the freedom to pursue 
one’s projects in certain, important areas of one’s life,59 or the freedom to set and pursue one’s 
own goals.60 It is this latter conception which today is most often associated with human 
dignity, most prominently and to my mind most convincingly in Dworkin’s later work.  
‘The second principle [of human dignity] – the principle of personal responsibility – holds that each person has a 
special responsibility for realising the success of his own life, a responsibility that includes exercising his judgment 
about what kind of life would be successful for him. He must not accept that anyone else has the right to dictate 
those personal values to him or impose them on him without his endorsement. He may defer to the judgments 
	
57 See, for example, Weinrib (above n 17), 7: ‘[T]he concept [of human dignity] concerns the 
equal right of each person to freedom.’ There is also an autonomy-denying interpretation of 
human dignity, according to which dignity requires dignified behaviour and thus authorises 
moralism; on this see, from a critical perspective, Michael Rosen, ‘Dignity: The Case Against’, 
in Christopher McCrudden (ed.), Understanding Human Dignity (Oxford University Press, 
2013),143, 149-52; Baer (above n 48), 457-9.  
58 As in the German interpretation of Article 2(1) of the Basic Law as protecting a right to 
freedom of action. See above n 12 and accompanying text.  
59 As proposed, for example, in James Griffin’s theory of human rights as protections of 
personhood; see James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2008), 33-37. See 
further the following famous statement by the plurality (O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter JJ) in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992), which also stresses the link between 
dignity and autonomy: ‘Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating 
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education … 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a 
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept 
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these 
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of 
the State.’  
60 Weinrib (above n 17), 7: ‘As free, each person has the right to determine the purposes that 
he or she will pursue.’  
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codified in a particular religious tradition or to those of religious leaders or texts or, indeed, of secular moral or 
ethical instructors. But that deference must be his own decision; it must reflect his own deeper judgment about 
how to acquit his sovereign responsibility for his own life.’61  
Dworkin’s argument about personal responsibility captures an intuition that almost everyone 
will share. The view that I hold with regard to myself, and which I suspect virtually everyone 
holds with regard to him- or herself, is that it is not the state’s business to get involved in the 
ethical choices that I make, for example by prohibiting my actions on the grounds that I am 
making ethically wrong, problematic, or worthless choices. But if we hold this view with regard 
to ourselves, then coherence requires that we also accept that everyone else has the right to live 
free from moralism and (hard62) paternalism.  
The paradigmatic example of a law violating moral autonomy, and indeed the political issue 
which sparked much of the discussion about moralism in the 1960s, was the prohibition of 
homosexual sex on the ground of its assumed immorality.63 The view that came to prevail is 
that independently of whether homosexual sex is ethically valuable or worthless, it is within 
the freedom of each agent to choose.64 However, the relevance of the idea of moral autonomy 
goes far beyond the protection of homosexual sex or even sexual freedom more broadly.65 It 
requires that any burden that the state imposes on a person cannot be justified by pointing to 
the ethical worthlessness of the person’s behaviour. For example, speech cannot be restricted 
on the grounds of the wrongness or unattractiveness of the ideas expressed;66 religious practice 
	
61 Dworkin (above n 46), 10.  
62 Hard (or deep) paternalism can be defined as imposing ethical values on a person, whereas 
soft (or superficial) paternalism is based on plausible assumptions about what a person’s values 
actually are. A paradigmatic example of the latter category would be seatbelt laws. See 
Dworkin (above n 46), 73.  
63 See the famous Hart-Devlin debate, with H.L.A. Hart taking the liberal and Patrick Devlin 
the conservative position: H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (Stanford University Press, 
1963); Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford University Press, 1959).  
64 See Dudgeon v. U.K., 1982 (4) E.H.R.R. 149, para 61: ‘”Decriminalisation” does not imply 
approval’. See further Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2484: ‘The petitioners are entitled 
to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny 
by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process 
Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the 
government.’ (Kennedy J).   
65 For other cases involving sexual freedom, see Laskey, Jaggard, and Brown v. U.K., 1997 
(24) E.H.R.R. 39 (sado-masochistic orgies); Stübing v. Germany, (2012) 55 E.H.R.R. 24 
(incest). 
66 See, for example, Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (Brennan J): ‘If there is a bedrock 
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the 
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.’ 
See also the European Court of Human Rights’ famous statement in Handyside v. U.K., (1979-
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cannot be prohibited or religious symbols advocated on the grounds of the rightness or the 
wrongness of the belief at stake; private choices cannot be prohibited on the grounds of 
disagreement about their ethical value,67 etc. More generally, moralism and (hard) paternalism 
– that is, basing the state’s policies on views about the ethical value of certain acts or beliefs – 
are impermissible.  
In the context of human and constitutional rights adjudication, the moral autonomy principle 
finds a well-established manifestation in the ‘legitimate goal’ stage of the proportionality test. 
Its function is to separate legitimate considerations that are in principle relevant for the 
justification of a policy – such as protecting other people’s rights, or protecting certain public 
goods – from considerations which are illegitimate and which therefore have no role to play in 
the justification of a policy. Goals that violate the dignitarian principle of moral autonomy, that 
is, moralistic or paternalistic goals, are excluded at this stage; this ensures that the following 
steps of the proportionality analysis examine whether the policy at stake can be justified by 
legitimate considerations.68  
To return to the example regarding assisted suicide introduced in the previous section,69 a 
properly conducted proportionality analysis excludes at the legitimate goal stage any goal that 
is related to ethical (including religious) disapproval of assisted suicide (‘It is immoral / against 
God’s will to assist someone with taking his or her life, and therefore it should be prohibited’), 
but it allows the goal of protecting vulnerable people from abuse (‘If we allow assisted suicide, 
this creates the risk of people being bullied into committing suicide’). The analysis at the next 
three stages (suitability/rational connection, necessity, balancing/proportionality in the strict 
sense) then examines whether the remaining, legitimate, goal of protecting vulnerable people 
from abuse justifies the policy of prohibiting assisted suicide. Gorsuch’s view that assisted 
suicide should be prohibited because it violates the intrinsic value of human life is moralistic 
and therefore inconsistent with the dignitarian structure of rights: it is not permissible for the 
state to override the right-holder’s judgment regarding the value of his or her life.  
While the basic idea of moral autonomy and its application in human and constitutional rights 
law is well understood, its full potential has not been uncovered yet. I will just point to one 
	
80) 1 H.H.R.R. 737, 744: ‘Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations 
of such a society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every 
man. Subject to Article 10 (2), it is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are 
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those 
that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of 
that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic society”.’  
67 For example, one aspect of the debate about whether there is a right to abortion is whether 
the state can take the view that the fetus constitutes human life, or whether doing so would be 
moralistic and it is the pregnant woman’s view that should prevail.  
68 Mattias Kumm, ‘Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights: On the Place and Limits 
of the Proportionality Requirement’ (above n 3), 142-148; Möller (above n 7), 183-193.  
69 Section III.2. 
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issue which is surprisingly under-theorised, namely the relationship between moral autonomy 
and cultural arguments. It is always possible to ‘repackage’ a moralistic argument as a cultural 
one: if an (assumedly) worthless individual choice is repeated often enough by a sufficiently 
large number of people, it will have an effect on the public culture. For example, instead of 
proposing the prohibition of homosexual sex because of its assumed immorality, one might 
claim that permitting homosexual sex and normalising homosexuality have a harmful effect on 
society’s commitment to the traditional family structure; instead of prohibiting assisted suicide 
as being against God’s will, one might argue that allowing assisted suicide will lead to a decline 
of respect for human life in society; instead of restricting the right of Muslim women to wear 
the hijab on the grounds of being a worthless personal choice, one points to the harm that such 
acts may pose to a societal commitment to gender equality. Apart from a short section in 
Dworkin’s book Is Democracy Possible Here?,70 this issue has received surprisingly little 
scholarly attention. My goal here is not to propose a solution but merely to point out an 
important and unresolved issue related to the proper reach of the dignitarian principle of moral 
autonomy.  
 
3. Fundamental equality 
It is uncontroversial that human dignity requires respect for the fundamental equality of all 
humans. As a matter of the history of ideas, one important source of this view is the Christian 
idea of imago Dei: the idea that humans are made in the image of God. It means that all humans 
have a divine ‘spark’ within them which is the basis of their unique and very high value and 
which also implies that in this regard all humans are fundamentally equal. We can see here that 
there is a close connection between the principle of intrinsic value and the principle of 
fundamental equality,71 and hence it is perhaps not surprising that Dworkin lumps the two 
together in his first principle of human dignity.72 Nevertheless I propose to treat them as distinct 
because their manifestations in human and constitutional rights law are different: the principle 
of intrinsic value is about the ways in which an actor (in the present context, usually the state) 
	
70 Dworkin accepts that culture influences the views and choices that people make, but he 
insists that the collective and deliberate manipulation of the culture is impermissible. See 
Dworkin (above n 46), 76.  
71 See Janet Soskice, ‘Human Dignity and the Image of God’, in Christopher McCrudden (ed.), 
Understanding Human Dignity (Oxford University Press, 2013), 229, 231-2: ‘[Imago Dei] has 
been the basis in Christian teaching for regarding every human being, no matter how poor, 
burdened, restricted, ragged, or dissolute, as entirely distinctive and worthy of reverence.’ See 
further David P. Gushee, ‘A Christian Theological Account of Human Worth’, in Christopher 
McCrudden (ed.), Understanding Human Dignity (Oxford University Press, 2013), 275, 278: 
‘Further, God is equally the Creator of all humans … There is one God who makes one 
humanity. This is a pivotal element of biblical creation theology, and it contributes at least an 
implicit primal human equality and unity.’ (Emphasis in the original).  
72 See above n 46 and accompanying text.  
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may treat a person, whereas the principle of equality is concerned with how an actor (the state) 
may treat one person vis-à-vis another. Take the example of slavery, which violates both the 
principle of intrinsic value and the principle of fundamental equality. Slavery is inconsistent 
with the principle of intrinsic value because a state that designates someone as a slave fails to 
treat him as having a high status, as someone who fundamentally matters and whose fate is, we 
might say, of cosmic importance. Slavery further violates the principle of fundamental equality 
because in a state that endorses slavery, there are not only slaves but also slaveholders, and the 
relationship between the two is inconsistent with every human’s equal importance.  
Thus, the principle of fundamental equality is concerned with the equal standing of persons 
relative to one another. This idea is very abstract and can be interpreted, and has been 
interpreted, in more than one way. A minimalistic, narrow interpretation would prohibit 
unjustified discrimination on the grounds of certain protected characteristics such as race, sex, 
sexual orientation, faith, etc. By contrast, a broad interpretation would include what is known 
in constitutional law as a general equality clause which prohibits any unjustifiable treatment of 
one person or group vis-à-vis another, independently of whether a protected characteristic is at 
stake; this is the position taken by the German Federal Constitutional Court with regard to 
Article 3(1) of the Basic Law.73 The underlying rationale of this view strikes me as better in 
tune with the dignitarian principle of equal importance because the protected characteristics 
used by the narrow approach are, to my mind, just pointers to areas where history teaches us 
that unjustifiable discrimination often occurs; but they carry no moral significance beyond that. 
Put differently, violations of fundamental equality occur also, even though perhaps less 
frequently, in areas unrelated to protected characteristics. Thus, the dignitarian requirement of 
respect for people’s fundamental equality requires the comprehensive protection offered by a 
general right to equality along the lines of the German approach.  
In the example of same sex marriage put forward in the previous section,74 the emerging 
consensus in the Western world is that the principle of fundamental equality requires the 
availability of same sex marriage. In short, it is seen, correctly to my mind, as unjustifiable for 
the state to provide the institution of marriage, with all its symbolic and concrete benefits, in a 
way that makes it available only to people of a heterosexual but not for those of a homosexual 
orientation. I should add that when reasonable people hold a view that conflicts with the 
demands of fundamental equality, this is almost never because they dispute the principle as 
such; only the most hardened racists, sexists, homophobes, etc., do that. Rather they make a 
moral mistake when applying the abstract principle to a specific situation. Finnis’ mistake lies 
in his view that the state can justifiably discriminate between people in order to promote 
ethically valuable lifestyles (and he believes that only heterosexual marriage is ethically 
valuable), whereas dignity insists that such discrimination is impermissible because judgment 
on the ethical value of a lifestyle lies within the personal responsibility of the person whose life 
it is. So the proper analysis of issue of same sex marriage (and many other issues of non-
	
73 Article 3(1) Basic Law: ‘All persons shall be equal before the law.’ 
74 Section III.2.  
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discrimination) will involve both the principle of moral autonomy and the principle of 
fundamental equality.  
Importantly, fundamental equality manifests itself not only with regard to the right to equality 
and the right to non-discrimination, but also in the application of the proportionality test. The 
suitability, necessity and balancing stages of the proportionality test are concerned with 
fundamental equality. I have developed this point in an earlier paper75 and will briefly 
summarise my argument here, because it is important for appreciating the interplay between 
the principles of moral autonomy and fundamental equality and the structure of human and 
constitutional rights.  A state that limits a right-holder’s right usually does so in order to benefit 
other people (or the public more generally). In a scenario where the burden on the right-holder 
is disproportionate in the strict sense (thus, it fails at the balancing stage of the proportionality 
test), the state made a mistake by placing a burden on the right-holder that is too severe, relative 
to the benefits that arise for others or the public. Had it imposed a less restrictive burden, or 
had the benefits for others or the public been greater, the measure might have been justified. 
Thus, by burdening the right-holder ‘too much’, it did not attach sufficient weight to his 
legitimate interests relative to other people’s interests, and it thus did not treat his interests as 
equally important as everyone else’s. This constitutes a violation of fundamental equality.  
As an illustration, take the case of Odiѐvre v France, where the ECtHR held by a narrow margin 
that France’s policy of allowing women to release their children for anonymous adoption did 
not violate Article 8 ECHR (the right to private life) of the child.76 The question was whether 
the child, later in life, has a human right to be informed of her biological mother’s identity. The 
relevant interests at stake were the child’s identity-related interest in finding out about her past, 
the biological mother’s interest in remaining anonymous, a public interest in avoiding 
abortions, and the interests of a range of other actors, including the biological father, potential 
biological siblings, and the members of the adoptive family. Seven dissenting judges came to 
the conclusion that France’s policy imposed a disproportionate burden on the applicant. To 
exemplify my point, let us assume for the sake of the argument that the dissenters were right. 
For them, the burden on the applicant was so severe that it was not outweighed by the interests 
of the biological mother, the adoptive family, and the public interest in avoiding abortions. Put 
differently, France attached too little weight to the identity-related interests of adopted children 
in finding out about their personal history, and it attached too much weight to the interests of, 
in particular, the biological mothers. Thus, France failed to attach sufficient weight to the 
legitimate interests of one group vis-à-vis another. As explained above, this is precisely what 
the dignitarian principle of fundamental equality prohibits.  
 
4. Dignity and the structure of rights  
	
75 [removed for review].  
76 Odiѐvre v France, (2004) 38 E.H.R.R. 43.  
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This, then, is an outline of the dignitarian structure of human and constitutional rights: rights 
protect human dignity, that is, the principles of intrinsic value, moral autonomy, and 
fundamental equality. The principles of moral autonomy and fundamental equality manifest 
themselves primarily in the proportionality analysis. At the legitimate goal stage of the test, 
illegitimate goals, that is, moralistic and paternalistic goals that are incompatible with the 
principle of moral autonomy, are excluded in order to ensure that they play no role in the 
justification of the policy. The subsequent suitability, necessity, and balancing stages are 
concerned with fundamental equality: they ensure that a policy does not impose a burden on a 
person which treats his interests as less important than other people’s.  
Absolute rights (which identify areas where proportionality does not apply) are often concerned 
with giving effect to the principle of intrinsic value. Thus, certain forms of treating people that 
are inconsistent with their high moral status are categorically impermissible; this includes 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, slavery, and forced labour. Procedural 
rights such as the right to a fair trial also follow primarily from the principle of intrinsic value 
which requires treating every person as someone whose views and interests fundamentally 
matter and who must therefore be treated in accordance with fair procedures.  
The above should not be read as a schematic way of mapping certain moral principles onto 
certain legal doctrines. Thus, my claim is not that the first stage of the proportionality test ought 
to be explained exclusively in terms of moral autonomy, the next three stages exclusively in 
terms of fundamental equality, and absolute rights exclusively in terms of intrinsic value. 
Rather, I offer the links between the three dignitarian principles and the respective doctrines 
and categories of rights as a rough categorisation that points to the dominant moral themes that 
are relevant in the respective contexts and suggests that there is no necessary tension or 
contradiction between regarding human dignity as the foundation of rights and the practice of 
rights adjudication with its categorisation of rights into absolute rights and rights subject to 
proportionate limitations.  
 
V. Conclusion 
The discussions about human and constitutional rights in the last twenty years have moved 
away from the formal theory of rights proposed by Alexy and towards substantive moral 
accounts. The view that has emerged is that the practice of rights adjudication is best explained 
in terms of the culture of justification or the right to justification, according to which the core 
of human and constitutional rights lies in a commitment to justification in terms of 
reasonableness or public reason. While this presents itself as a substantive moral theory, I have 
shown that the reference to reasonableness and public reason conceals rather than reveals a 
number of further commitments. The goal of this article has been to uncover and make explicit 
these substantive moral commitments, which I have labelled the dignitarian structure of human 
and constitutional rights with its principles of intrinsic value, moral autonomy, and 
fundamental equality.  
If this has been successful, then we can now articulate a more appealing account of the culture 
of justification and the right to justification. The culture of justification as conventionally 
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understood insists that every person is entitled to a reasonable justification for any burden 
placed on him or her by the state. This translates into the familiar doctrinal structure of a wide 
scope of prima facie rights coupled with the requirement that any interference with these rights 
must be proportionate, that is, reasonably justifiable. The conclusion of this essay is that the 
act in question must be reasonably justifiable to him or her as a human being with human 
dignity, that is, it must be reasonably justifiable in light of the dignitarian principles of intrinsic 
value, moral autonomy, and fundamental equality.  
This may seem like a modest clarification, but its implications are considerable. Shifting the 
focus towards the three dignitarian principles allows us to address the nature of human and 
constitutional rights in general and specific rights issues in particular not (only) in the doctrinal 
framework of proportionality or the vague language of reasonableness, but (also) in the 
substantive moral language of the principles on which rights are based. Given that, as I have 
stressed above, fundamental rights, including those acknowledged by the positive law, are 
creatures of morality and must correspondingly be analysed in moral terms, this strikes me as 
the right approach from an intellectual perspective and also as one which holds the promise of 
a deeper and more meaningful engagement with both rights theory and specific rights issues.  
